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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, Regulation 
and Policy at the International Hellenic University.  
Cross-border electricity trade between European Union´s Member-States has been 
developed significantly during the last decade and it has proven to be a significant part 
of the overall European energy strategy. The aim of my dissertation is to explore the 
regulatory framework of the Greek cross-border electricity trade and the prospects of 
Greek interconnections with neighboring countries from the perspective of the EU law. 
Firstly, it is explained why electricity transactions may have a positive effect on the 
electricity markets of the Member-States. Additionally, an overview of the European 
regulatory framework on electricity cross-border transactions with an emphasis on 
Regulation 714/2009/EC is provided. Afterward, an analysis of the Greek Regulatory 
framework takes place and the procedure of electricity imports and exports in the 
Greek borders is analyzed. In the end of my dissertation, it is concluded that the cross-
border electricity trade in the Greek borders abstains significantly from what it is 
considered the ideal in the European regulatory framework. However, given that 
electricity market in Greece is in a transitional phase, these inconsistencies are 
expected to be minimized progressively in the long-term. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the times of the historical electricity-related discoveries of the 18th century, 
electric power has progressively gained a vital role in the function and the structure of 
modern societies and economies. Electricity is not anymore a luxury for the few but an 
important stone in the building of the socioeconomic system and as such, it tends to 
penetrate more and more in sectors such as trading markets. This penetration has 
become more intensive, especially after the liberalization process of the wholesale 
electricity market initiated in the USA with the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 
19781 and in Europe with the 1987 Single European Act2. However, what consists a 
trend about electricity trade nowadays more than ever, it is the systematic effort in 
the European Union´s context to move from nationals or regionals electricity markets 
to a common electricity market characterized by continuous cross-border electricity 
transactions between Member-States (Internal Energy Market). 
Despite the increased cross-border electricity transactions in EU (around 10% of gross 
production in 2011)3, electricity trade cannot be treated as a usual commodity due to 
its physical properties. Firstly, electricity cannot be stored in large volumes and thus, it 
must be consumed continuously, meaning that consumption must be equal to the 
demand at any given point in time. As it is normal, this physical property of electricity 
calls for a well-balanced electricity market and creates extremely volatile prices, while 
once inserted in the electricity power pool or transmission system, electricity produced 
by one generator is indistinguishable from the electricity produced by a different 
producer4. Another particularity of electricity consists the fact that for electricity 
deliveries to be realized, a developed transmission/distribution grid and 
                                                 
1Paulidis, G. (2014) Networks and electricity markets in US. In Energy: Networks and Infrastructure, Farantouris, N. 
(editor), Nomiki Vivliothiki Publications, Athens, Greece, pp. 146 (in Greek). 
2Leigh, H.et al. (2010) Manufacturing the EU Energy Markets: The Current Dynamics of Regulatory Practice. Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), Florence, Italy, Working Paper, pp.1. 
3Baritaud, M. et al. (2014) SEAMLESS POWER MARKETS Regional Integration of Electricity Markets in IEA Member 
Countries. International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, France, Working Paper, pp. 83. 
4Bielecki, J. (2004) Electricity Trade: Overview of Current Flows and Infrastructure. In Electricity Trade in Europe, 
Bielecki, J. (editor), Kluwer Law Publications, Hague, Netherlands, pp.6. 
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interconnections are demanded so as not only electric power to be delivered from one 
point to another, but also technical grid problems and congestion constrains to be 
avoided. 
From a legal point of view, electricity trade differs from the trade of other 
commodities because «international sales of electricity present unique problems that 
are different from those presented by the usual international sales of goods. For this 
reason, the CISG (Convention on the International Sale of Goods) does not apply to the 
sales of electricity»5. Due to the fact that electricity consists an extraordinary 
commodity, there is a whole discussion in theory about the qualification of electricity 
as a good or as service. Since 1994 the European Court of Justice, in the case C-393/92 
(Gemeente Almelo v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij) accepted that electricity is a good and, 
thus, the principle of the free movement of goods is applicable in the case of electricity 
trade. In the Greek Civil Code (article 947), electricity is also recognized as a 
commodity. On the other hand, the nature of electricity as a service and especially as 
Public Service Obligation (PSO) is indisputable. An interesting opinion which enlightens 
the ambiguous legal qualification of electricity is that claiming that electricity in 
electricity supply activities is qualified as a commodity, while electricity production, 
transmission and distribution are qualified as services6.  
Given the particularities of cross-border electricity trade in comparison to the 
international trade of other commodities, the present dissertation aims at featuring 
the most important aspects of European Union´s (EU) policies and legislation on cross-
border electricity trade, while a case study of the legislative regulation of Greek 
electricity transactions with neighboring countries is provided too. Specifically, the 
document is divided into two parts. In the first part, the European legislative approach 
on electricity transactions between the Member-States and the idea of the Internal 
Energy Market (IEM) are explained and assessed. In the first chapter, the interrelation 
of the cross-border electricity trade concept with the three pillars of EU energy policy 
is analyzed and evaluated. In the same chapter, the prerequisites for effective 
electricity transactions between the Member-States are listed. Next, in another 
                                                 
5Mantysaari, P. (2015) EU Electricity Trade Law. Springer Publications, Switzerland, pp. 71. 
6Panagos, Th. (2012) Institutional Framework of the energy market. Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, Greece, pp.6. 
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chapter, the legislation concerning the software (legislation) and the hardware 
(interconnections) of electricity trade is analyzed. A great emphasis is given on the so-
called Third Liberalization Package and the role of ACER and ENTSO-E. In the chapter 
that follows, the notion and the benefits of the Target Model are commented briefly.  
In the second part of this paper, the Greek case is explained. Firstly, the importance of 
electricity transactions for the Greek electricity market is analyzed. Afterward, an 
introduction to the Greek electricity wholesale market is provided. Next, the Greek 
legislation on cross-border electricity trade and the role of the Greek National 
Regulatory Authority (RAE), of the Transmission System Operator (TSO) and of Market 
Operator (LAGIE) are analyzed. In the next chapter, the existing Greek interconnections 
are presented and assessed. Following this evaluation, the prerequisites for 
participation in cross-border electricity transactions as a merchant in Greece are listed. 
In the final chapter of the document, a comparison of the Greek cross-border 
electricity transactions´ market and the EU electricity market vision is provided and 
some conclusions are presented. 
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1. CROSS-BORDER ELECTRICITY TRADE: AN IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF 
EU ENERGY STRATEGY 
The implementation of a common procedure regarding cross-border electricity 
transactions consists an important dimension of EU´s energy strategy. Security of 
supply, decarbonization and competitiveness are the cornerstones of EU´s energy 
policy. What is under examination, it is the effect of the concept of an integrated 
energy market with increased cross-border electricity transactions on each of these 
pillars. The prerequisites for effective cross-border electricity trade must be 
investigated too. 
1.1 The three pillars of EU energy policy & cross-border electricity trade 
The adoption of common energy rules has been a key feature of the European Union´s 
policies from the very beginning, as the content of the two original Treaties reveals, 
namely the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community regulating the 
market of coal and steel and the Euratom Treaty about nuclear energy. Moving to the 
present, the vision of an Energy Union in EU with common priorities and targets has 
not been abandoned. On the contrary, it is further detailed in the Framework Strategy 
for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, according 
to which: «The goal of a resilient Energy Union with an ambitious climate policy at its 
core is to give EU consumers - households and businesses - secure, sustainable, 
competitive and affordable energy»7. In order to achieve these goals an «integrated 
continent-wide energy system where energy flows freely across borders, based on 
competition and the best possible use of resource»8  must be considered a 
fundamental prerequisite. Thus, the effect of electricity transactions between 
Member-States on the vision of secure, sustainable and competitive electricity must be 
examined. 
                                                 
7
European Commission (2015) Energy Union Package: A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a 
Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy. COM (2015) 80 final, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 2. 
8
See supra note 7, pp. 2. 
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1.1.1 Security of Supply 
Establishing an Energy Union where continuous cross-border electricity trade takes 
place, is considered by the European Commission to be an important tool for achieving 
its energy-related objectives. Specifically for the case of energy security, historically, 
the first electricity interconnections were constructed in order to face situations of 
high electricity demand and decreased national electricity production (emergency 
situations). In situations like these, coordinated electricity exchanges with neighboring 
countries are vital, as the Italian blackout in 2003 has proved9. Besides, access to a 
broader portfolio of electricity power plants strengths the reliability of national electric 
systems by increasing the required production capacity in cases of national shortages. 
Additionally, as it is expected, electricity generation mix between neighboring 
countries differ and, thus, cross-border transactions provide access to a variety of 
generation mix, increasing the system´s reliability. A recent example of this policy took 
place in 2013 when Belgium imported electricity to face the temporary shutdown of its 
nuclear reactors10. To sum up, cross-border electricity transactions increase national 
systems reliability by diversifying the energy portfolio geographically and by fuel type. 
However, it must be noted that electricity transactions between Member-States 
contribute in achieving security of electricity supply, but only under the condition that 
there are adequate interconnections and coordinated policies between the Member-
States concerned. In every case, the concept of national security of supply and 
autonomy and the perception that a State should be the guarantor of its supply should 
not be totally overlooked. 
1.1.2 Sustainability 
Regarding the transition to a low carbon economy through the penetration of 
renewable energy (RE) in the energy mix and the increase in energy efficiency in the 
Union, cross-border electricity trade may be a valuable tool. First of all, the production 
of electricity from wind and solar is characterized by high intermittency and, thus, RE 
increases significantly the instability of national electricity systems. Access to a wider 
                                                 
9See supra note 3, pp. 14. 
10See supra note 3, pp. 26. 
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portfolio of power plants, over a wider geographical area through cross-border 
electricity transactions would be a decisive response to the intermittency problem of 
RE. Other solutions to intermittency problem may be accompanied by important 
disadvantages, such as the capacity mechanisms, which not only distort the market but 
also contradict the objective of reducing the subsidies to fossil fuel power plants. In 
addition, given that solar and wind generation profiles in many cases can be 
complementary, cross-border electricity transactions «over large distances has the 
potential both to smooth output variability and reduce the forecasting errors 
associated with wind and solar power»11. However, it must be noted that if cross-
border electricity trade is not combined with coordinated environmental policies, 
electricity trade may give broader access to the consumption of cheap energy 
produced by pollutant fossil fuels such as by coal or even shale gas. 
Furthermore, cross-border trade can have an important effect on the increase of 
energy efficiency. Specifically, seasonal variation in both demand and production 
between neighboring Member-States means that excess electricity produced in 
Northern Europe during summer can be used to cover summer peaks in Southern 
Europe due to air-conditioning (and vice versa) limiting the operation of extra power 
plants in Southern Europe. Accordingly, Member-States with a large amount of hydro 
capacity may have excess supplies available during spring, which can be used for 
exports reducing total required generation capacity in neighboring countries12. 
According to International Energy Agency (IEA): «In European countries, synchronous 
peak demand was 5% lower in 2011 than peak demand of each country taken 
separately This gives an order of magnitude of possible gains from a regional approach 
towards generation adequacy»13. 
1.1.3 Competitiveness 
Competitiveness and affordability of electricity prices in Europe are claimed to be 
favored by cross-border electricity trade. To be more specific, according to a 2013 
                                                 
11See supra note 3, pp. 19.  
12See supra note 4, pp. 8. 
13See supra note 3, pp. 17. 
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report prepared for the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy, the 
estimated benefits of full electricity market integration are expected to reach between 
EUR 12.5 billion and EUR 40 billion per year14. This can be explained not only by the 
fact that in a wider geographic area the scope for possible import and export 
transactions is multiplied, leading to favorable conditions for a competitive electricity 
market, but also because cheap energy from the generation plant with the lowest 
marginal costs in the interconnected system is used. Besides, as it was analyzed, 
electricity trade results in reducing the overall system costs by taking advantage of the 
complementarities in demand differences between electricity systems. Despite these 
arguments, there is a debate over the positive effect of electricity trade on electricity 
prices. The possibility to increase electricity prices in exporting countries due to 
exports explains the worries in jurisdictions with cheap electricity prices that electricity 
trade will raise national prices raising profitability for producers at the expense of their 
consumers. Similarly, in jurisdictions with cheap electricity for large electricity-
intensive industries, there may be a reluctance to export electricity at the expense of 
the trade dislocation caused by a potential reduction in electricity-intensive 
manufacturing export15. 
Additionally to the interrelation between EU energy targets and cross-border 
electricity trade, it is to note that electricity transactions in the internal of EU include 
important benefits from a political point of view promoting tighter political relations 
between the Member-States and, thus, facilitating the implementation of speaking 
with one voice in external policy concept16. Furthermore, from a financial perspective, 
extensive electricity transactions means that the market where the electricity is 
produced is enlarged and, thereby, the market risks are reduced favoring investments 
in large-size projects. 
                                                 
14Booz & Company (2013) Benefits of an Integrated European Energy Market. Booz & Company, Amsterdam, report 
prepared for DG Energy European Commission, pp. 4. 
15Oseni, M. et al. (2014) Institutional Arrangements for the Promotion of Regional Integration of Electricity Markets: 
International Experience. The World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper 6947, pp. 
6. 
16For more information on the concept see at: European Commission (2014) Energy security: Commission puts 
forward comprehensive strategy to strengthen security of supply. IP/14/606, Brussels, Belgium. 
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1.2 Prerequisites for effective cross-border electricity trade 
As it has been analyzed in the previous section, cross-border electricity trade may have 
a major contribution in the realization of EU Energy Strategy. However, increased 
cross-border electricity transactions do not guarantee the positive results described. 
On the contrary, a lot of prerequisites must be full filled in order not only European 
energy targets to be achieved through electricity transactions, but also the volumes of 
electricity traded in the EU to be further increased. To start with, electricity is a 
commodity with special features. One of these features is that electricity trade is 
network-depended meaning that for electricity imports/exports not only 
interconnections are demanded (as electricity does not flow across pre-existing 
electrical boundaries), but also interconnections with adequate transmission capacity 
are demanded. Consequently, network infrastructure investments must be regularly 
realized to permit increased electricity transactions. According to a 2013 analysis, cost 
optimal trading within the EU would require to 76% more transmission capacity17. This 
percentage occurs not only because transmission capacity facilitates cross-border 
trading, but also because loop flows hinder transactions by creating congestion, which 
may be internal to a country, meaning that cross-zonal capacity is affected by the 
capacity of the internal network Thus, the existence of network infrastructure is 
fundamental for cross-border electricity trade to be developed. 
Another important barrier to the further increase of cross-border electricity trade 
could be the reluctance of countries to import energy, in order to limit their 
dependence on their neighbors. The possible unwillingness of Member-States to 
abandon their energy-related competence and the discrimination between internal 
and cross-zonal exchanges can lead not only to limited investments in electricity 
network infrastructure, but also to the limited implementation of EU energy policies 
hindering the establishment of a strong Energy Union and the adoption of the 
solidarity clause18. The case of the Swedish transmission system operator (TSO) who 
                                                 
17See supra note 15, pp. 4. 
18«Solidarity clause: The Member-States to reduce the dependence on single suppliers and fully rely on their 
neighbours, especially when confronted with energy supply disruptions» [European Commission (2015) Energy 
Union: secure, sustainable, competitive, affordable energy for every European. IP/15/4497 Press Release, 2015, p.1] 
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limited the interconnections capacities in order to avoid internal congestion is an 
example of such unwillingness19. Thus, electricity trade between Member-States can 
be promoted only when the States involved are willing to respect and implement the 
policies of EU energy Strategy.  
However, despite the existence of adequate interconnectors and despite the 
willingness of neighboring States to be involved in extensive electricity transactions, 
the coordination of national legislations is the most fundamental prerequisite for 
efficient cross-border trade. The harmonization of inconsistent national rules would 
importantly facilitate imports/exports of electricity and make them more appealing to 
possible importers/exporters. Additionally, a common legislative framework would 
increase the efficiency of European transmission system. That is especially true for the 
case of cross-zonal capacity calculation-allocation rules and for congestion 
management rules, which if not coordinated between the involved States can lead to 
inefficient use of existing transmission networks. In ACER´s report, it is specifically 
mentioned that «the evolution of physical congestions … may not be suitable to be 
resolved solely by investments… A framework is needed that allows the configuration 
of appropriate bidding zones to adapt to changes in the evolution of congestions».20 
Except the coordination of technical rules, the coordination of reliability and security 
rules would increase visibility and investment incentives promoting electricity imports 
and exports. 
Competition policies between Member-States must be also coordinated. In the case 
that competition policy enforcement is weaker in a State than another, there are 
concerns that there may be distortions in electricity markets. However, concerning the 
EU, which has established a pan-European competition policy, such problems could be 
handled. On the contrary, a possible barrier to cross-border trade is the different level 
of electricity markets privatization between the States. It is suggested that 
privatization has the potential to facilitate higher cross-border trade. It is also shown 
                                                 
19Commission Decision No. 39351/2010 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, Case 39351- Swedish Interconnectors. 
20ACER/CEER (2015) Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets in 
2014. Ljubljana, Slovenia, pp. 163. 
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that the age of privatization has a positive impact on cross-border trade21. Besides, the 
high concentration of market power in the hands of few utilities and insufficient 
unbundling may have an adverse effect on the access to networks and, thus, to 
electricity trade. Thus, regulatory issues are the reason why the full implementation of 
the so-called Third Liberalization Package in all Member-States is a prerequisite for the 
further development of cross-border trade. 
Finally, the establishment of independent institutions supervising the imports/exports 
procedure may have a crucial contribution to the proper function of the electricity 
trade. According to IEA «Integrated markets require integrated institutions. 
Institutional design remains fundamental to developing and sustaining competitive 
electricity markets as the resulting neutrality and transparency support economic 
decision-making across the integrated market»22. Consequently, the establishment of 
ACER and ENTSO-E are considered to be fundamental for the development of cross-
border electricity trade in EU. Their role and their competencies are analyzed in the 
next Chapter.  
                                                 
21Torriti, J. (2014) Privatization and cross-border electricity trade: From internal market to European Supergrid?. 
Energy, 77, pp. 639.  
22See supra note 3, pp. 34. 
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2. LEGAL ASPECTS OF EU CROSS-BORDER ELECTRICITY TRADE 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Regulations and the 
Directives of the three Liberalization Packages consist the main legal texts regulating 
the electricity imports/exports in the internal of the Union. Their provisions are 
analyzed in this chapter. In the first section, the three Liberalization Packages and the 
basic legislation on cross-border electricity trade are briefly presented. A special 
emphasis is given on Regulation 714/2009 and on ACER´s and ENTSO-E´s role. In the 
second section, the electricity networks´ legislation and the notion of Projects of 
Common Interest are shortly analyzed. 
2.1 Treaty provisions on energy markets 
The Treaty of Lisbon, which was entered into force in 2009, extends, for the first time 
in EU history, the Union's competence in matters of energy. Specifically, the article 194 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union lists the objectives of 
European energy policy. The fourth of these objectives is the promotion of the 
interconnection of energy networks between Member-States «in the context of the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to 
preserve and improve the environment»23. Thus, under Article 194 it was introduced a 
specific legal basis regarding the energy sector. Consequently, the energy sector is 
established as one of the shared competences between the EU and its Member-States 
subjected, however, to the principle of subsidiarity24. The extenuation of EU energy 
competencies by the Lisbon Treaty is of great importance for the establishment of a 
coherent legal approach to EU cross-border electricity trade, as early European 
legislators had to rely on a varying mix of legal bases for EU energy policy.  
                                                 
23Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012), OJ C 326/47, art. 194 par.1. 
24Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, 
either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level [Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (2012), OJ C 326/47, art. 5 par.3]. 
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The development of EU electricity trade is also importantly facilitated by European 
competition law, which strictly regulates the internal energy market and substitutes 
the lack of a common European energy regulator to control the markets and the 
Member-States. Due to competition law, the Commission has extensive competencies 
in promoting the competition in electricity markets and, consequently, the liquidity in 
EU electricity trade. Interventions to promote network access such as UK-France 
interconnectors’ case25 and antitrust action in the field of long-term supply contracts 
consist indicative examples of Commission’s contribution to the development of cross-
border electricity trade. 
2.2 The three Liberalization Packages 
The most important step to the establishment of a common electricity market in EU, 
where the cross-border electricity transactions would be flourishing, include the 
adoption of three legislative packages, called Liberalization Packages, initiated in 1996. 
The ﬁrst legislative package includes the First Electricity Directive (Council Directive 
96/92/EC). The provisions of the Directive 96/92/EC having an effect on the function of 
cross-border electricity trade into the Union include the designation of independent 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs) responsible for the control, maintenance, 
system development and connection to other systems. Additionally, the Directive 
stipulates the imposition of accounting and functioning unbundling on vertically 
integrated electricity undertakings (VIU)26. Another important provision is the 
guarantee of free access to the transmission network for electricity producers and 
supply undertakings (third-party access), based on competition law and particularly on 
the theory of essential facilities (essential facilities doctrine). 
Some years later, in 2003, the First Electricity Directive was replaced by the Council 
Directive 2003/54/EC which imposed stricter requirements on Member-States to 
introduce competition in their markets. Specifically, the Second Electricity Directive 
                                                 
25European Commission (2001) UK-French electricity interconnector opens up, increasing scope for competition. 
IP/01/341, Brussels, Belgium. 
26For more information on the different concepts of unbundling see: Energy Charter Secretariat (2015) The role of 
the Energy Charter Treaty in fostering regional electricity market integration: Lessons learnt from the EU and 
implications for Northeast Asia. Brussels, Belgium, pp. 60. 
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imposed the legal unbundling of VIU. Additionally, it strengthened the concept of TPA 
by withdrawing the negotiated access and the single buyer option, instituted in the 
Council Directive 96/92/EC. Furthermore, the Directive established the obligation to 
National Regulatory Authorities to be independent of their energy stakeholders' 
interests. It is to note that in the Second Liberalization Package it is also included the 
Council Regulation 1228/2003/EC regarding cross-border exchanges in electricity. 
The third Electricity Directive (Council Directive 2009/72/EC) was adopted by the 
Commission in 2009 and introduced the concept of ownership unbundling. It also calls 
for the implementation of a system of TPA to the transmission and distribution 
systems based on published tariffs, applicable objectively and without discrimination 
to all system users. Additionally, the article 6 of the Council Directive 2009/72/EC 
promotes electricity trade by asking to Member-States and NRA to «facilitate the 
cooperation of transmission system operators at a regional level, including on cross-
border issues» and specifically NRAs to coordinate in order to enable the optimal 
management of the network and to develop network codes and rules governing the 
management of congestion. Finally, the Directive establishes the obligation for NRAs to 
have their own resources and separate annual budget allocation. 
TPA and TSOs´ unbundling consist basic prerequisites for the development of 
competition in electricity markets, which in turn permits the realization of extended 
cross-border electricity trade. Given that electricity trade is network-dependent, open 
access to infrastructure in a non-discriminatory and transparent way is a prerequisite 
for electricity imports/exports increase. Similarly, the requirement of unbundling of 
national TSOs consists a guarantee of the non-discriminatory treatment of the network 
users. Finally, the establishment of NRAs which are characterized by functional and 
accountable independence guarantees competition conditions of high quality and 
promotes electricity imports/exports. 
2.3 Regulation 714/2009: The core of cross-border electricity trade legislation 
2.3.1 Regulation´s main provisions & Network Codes 
Even if the three electricity Directives created the preconditions for liberalized and 
competitive electricity markets and, thus, for extended cross-border transactions, it 
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was the adoption of Council Regulation 1228/2003/EC and Council Regulation 
714/2009/EC which included provisions exclusively on cross-border electricity trade in 
the Union. The legal instrument chosen (Regulation) is the one that is directly 
applicable in Member-States, in contrast to Directive, implying the intention of 
Commission to limit the discretion of Member-States regarding the regulated key-
areas. The regime is based on the competence of EU to adopt measures for the 
establishment of the Internal Market according to article 194 of the Treaty on the 
Function of the European Union. 
The most recent Council Regulation 714/2009/EC repeals the previous regulation and 
aims at setting fair rules for cross-border exchanges in electricity and facilitating the 
emergence of a well-functioning and transparent common wholesale market. As the 
regulation repealed, Regulation 714/2009/EC introduces inter-TSO compensation 
mechanism to compensate for costs of hosting cross-border electricity flows on their 
networks. Secondly, it encourages charging for network access but prohibits 
discriminatory and distance-related charges. It imposes publicity obligations to TSOs 
and information and confidentiality obligations to Member-States and NRAs. 
Additionally, the Regulation adopts some general principles of congestion 
management such as the prohibition of discriminatory market-based solutions and 
transactions based methods, the imposition of transaction curtailment procedures 
only in emergency situations and the use of revenues resulting from the allocation of 
interconnection only for specifically defined purposes. The Regulation shall be without 
prejudice to the rights of Member States to adopt detailed provisions. 
What must be highlighted regarding Council Regulation 714/2009/EC, it is the 
introduction of the concept of network codes which was not included in Council 
Regulation 1228/2003/EC and which consist a valuable tool for the harmonization of 
rules for cross-border electricity trade. According to the articles 6 and 8 of Council 
Regulation 714/2009/EC, the network codes, meaning the set of common rules for all 
national networks, are designed by ENTSO-E accordingly to non-binding framework 
guidelines summited by ACER27 and approved by the Commission. The network codes 
shall cover 12 areas of network operations and can be distinguished in connection, 
                                                 
27For ENTSO-E and ACER concepts see below. 
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operational and market codes28. Network codes once finalized and adopted will have 
the status of any other European Regulation and will govern all electricity markets. The 
contribution of coherent European codes concerns the elimination of inconsistencies 
at national level leading to market segmentation and the realization of EU's long-term 
vision for energy, such as the creation of a pan-EU transmission network. However, the 
full implementation of each network code requires a series of steps to be taken (i.e. 
national decisions, regional arrangements), as their implementation will cause some 
friction to the existing national approaches and «is likely to be a long-term project the 
results of which will be cumulative and not be available for some time»29. 
2.3.2 The establishment of ENTSO-E 
A key component of the Regulation 714/2009/EC consists the establishment of the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for electricity (ENTSO-E). ENTSO-
E currently represents 42 electricity TSOs from 35 countries across Europe. Its mission 
is «to promote the completion and functioning of the internal market in electricity and 
cross-border trade»30. The establishment of ENTSO-E is of great importance for the 
realization of the IEM, as the increased co-operation of TSOs via ENTSO-E will increase 
the degree of market harmonization and lead to better network and operational 
reliability and, thus, to increased electricity exchanges. Except from drafting network 
codes, ENTSO-E´s main tasks include (1) the adoption of a non-binding Community-
wide ten-year network development plan, which regulates hardware issues such as 
optimized network planning, (2) the drafting of annual reports, (3) the drafting of 
generation adequacy outlooks, (4) the coordination of technical cooperation and (5) 
the coordination of research and development plans between TSOs 31. 
                                                 
28ENTSO-E (2014) An Introduction to Network Codes & the Links between Codes, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 6. 
29Herbert Smith Freehills (2015) A Survey of Current Issues in the European Energy Sector. Newberry, M. and 
Goldberg. (Editors), pp. 16. 
30Council Regulation 714/2009/EC, article 4. 
31For more information on ENTSO-E´s tasks see ENTSO-E´s webpage. Available from: 
https://www.entsoe.eu/about-entso-e/Pages/default.aspx 
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2.3.3 Guidelines 
It is to note that in Annex I of the Regulation it is included a set of Guidelines regarding 
the allocation of available transfer capacity of interconnectors. According to these 
Guidelines, the EU Member-States are grouped based on their location in regions, in 
each of which a common coordinated congestion management method and procedure 
for the allocation of interconnection´s capacity shall be applied (bottom-up approach). 
Totally, there are seven regions and the distinction is based on the idea of the Regional 
Initiatives which were set up in 2006 by the European Commission and NRAs to foster 
the integration of energy markets at regional level. Greece belongs to the third group 
which includes countries such as Italy, Austria and Slovenia. However, except for the 
Guidelines attached to the Regulation 714/2009/EC as Annex, the article 18 of the 
Regulation gives the power to the Commission to adopt guidelines on a range of issues 
such as tariff calculation methods and inter-TSO compensation mechanisms.  
The choice of the specific legal tool (Guideline) indicates the coordination approach 
adopted by the European legislator for the creation of an integrated electricity market 
instead of the consolidation one. However, the adoption of «soft law» measures such 
as Guidelines do not affect the binding character of their provisions. In the case of 
different interpretation of Guidelines by TSOs, the Commission has the power to 
amend Guidelines, enabling it to compel TSOs to comply with the questioned texts. 
Thus, the Guidelines do not rely for their effectiveness on the States´ willingness to co-
operate. In that sense, Guidelines are not soft law32. 
2.3.4 The role of ACER 
To close up with, apart from the Electricity Regulation, the Third Liberalization Package 
includes the Council Regulation 713/2009/EC establishing the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), which replaced ERGEG. According to the 
Regulation, ACER´s main purpose is to assist NRAs and, where necessary, to coordinate 
their action. Thus, ACER works towards the completion of the single EU energy market. 
Its legal status is governed by the standard rules which apply to Community regulatory 
                                                 
32Cameron, P. (2005) The internal market in energy: harnessing the new regulatory regime. European Law Review, 
30(5), pp. 642. 
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agencies and its competencies are advisory and decision-making. Its advisory 
competencies include the establishment of framework-guidelines on conditions for 
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity, the monitor of regional 
cooperation of TSOs and the provision of opinions upon request from the Commission. 
Additionally, ACER adopts individual decisions on technical issues and has the authority 
to grant exemptions from TPA to new major electricity interconnectors. It is to note 
that ACER received additional tasks under Council Regulation 1227/2011/EC (REMIT) 
and under Council Regulation 347/2013/EC. However, speaking from a legal point of 
view, ACER is vested with a limited degree of discretionary power. That is explained by 
Meroni doctrine, according to which European institutions cannot confer on a delegate 
powers different from those that the delegating authority itself received under the 
Treaty. Moreover, such delegation must be limited to implement powers clearly 
defined and entirely supervised33. 
2.4 Legislation & the hardware of electricity trade 
Cross-border lines have been characterized as the backbone structure for the 
European wide Internal Energy Market. Specifically for the case of electricity, adequate 
transmission lines and interconnectors are a prerequisite for electrons to flow from 
one country to another and that is the reason why the regulation of new investments 
on transmission lines may have a huge effect on cross-border electricity transactions. 
Recognizing the benefits of better interconnections, the European Commission 
adopted the 10% Interconnection Target to Member-States by 2020 and the 15% 
Interconnection Target by 203034. The legal basis of the 10% Interconnection Target 
could be found on article 170 par.1 of Treaty on the Function of the European Union 
according to which «...the Union shall contribute to the establishment and 
development of trans-European networks in the areas of…energy infrastructures». 
The main EU legal instrument for trans-European energy networks (TEN-E) is the 
Council Regulation 347/2013/EC οn guidelines for trans-European energy 
                                                 
33Haverbeke, D., et. al. (2010) European Energy Markets and the New Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators. 
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 28 No.3, par. 420. 
34European Commission (2015) Connecting power markets to deliver security of supply, market integration and the 
large-scale uptake of renewables. MEMO/15/4486, Brussels, Belgium, Fact Sheet. 
  -20- 
infrastructure. The Regulation repeals Decision 1364/2006/EC, which laid down the 
general rules for the granting of Community financial aid in the field of TEN-E and aims 
to address effectively the EU’s energy infrastructure needs. Specifically, the Regulation 
sets out guidelines for the development and interoperability of priority corridors and 
energy infrastructure at European level by establishing 12 strategic regional groups for 
the construction of energy infrastructure with a cross-border dimension. 
In order to succeed in its targets, the Regulation 347/2013/EC defines a special regime 
for projects which contribute to the priority corridors called «Projects of Common 
Interest» (PCIs). A project to be identified as a PCI must fulfill some criteria: (1) to be 
necessary for at least one of the energy infrastructure priority corridors and areas, (2) 
its potential overall benefits assessed according to specific criteria to outweigh its 
costs, (3) to involve directly or indirectly at least two Member States, and (4) to 
contribute significantly to sustainability and/or security of supply and/or 
competition35. For the qualification of a project as a PCI, a bottom-up process takes 
place and once qualified as such the project grants financial support and other 
advantages such as faster and more efficient permission processes and improved 
regulatory treatment. The selected PCI are included in a list established every two 
years. It is to note that PCIs should be listed either as stand-alone PCIs or as a part of a 
cluster of several PCI36. To close up with, the concept of PCI is expected to have a 
major contribution to the completion of the IEM. 
  
                                                 
35Regulation 347/2013/EC, article 4. 
36For more information see at: Commission Delegated Regulation 2016/89/EC. 
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3. European Target Model 
European Target Model consists a fundamental part of the EU energy policy and an 
important step towards the establishment of the Internal Energy Market. The idea of 
Target Model is based on two main principles and focuses on six key areas. Both the 
principles and the key areas are briefly analyzed in this Chapter. 
3.1 Target Model & its basic principles 
An Internal Energy Market (IEM) demands the free flow of energy across EU without 
any technical or regulatory barrier. Thus, the establishment of the IEM requires «a 
fundamental transformation of EU´s electric system, including the redesigned of 
European electricity market»37. A decisive initiative towards the establishment of IEM 
is the concept of the European Target Model (TM) for electricity wholesale market 
design which was decided to be developed in 2008, by the European Electricity 
Regulatory Forum (Florence Forum). According to ENTSO-E «the implementation of the 
target models in gas and electricity is equivalent to the completion of the IEM»38. 
Target Model is based on two broad principles: energy only regional markets (instead 
of capacity markets) and market coupling39. The implementation of the model follows 
a bottom-up approach through regional market coupling projects, while the 
establishment of the model a top-down approach through ENTSO-E´s and ACER´s 
network codes. The adoption of the Third Energy Package enhanced importantly the 
implementation of the Target Model whose basic principles are included in the 
Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management Regulation (Regulation 
1222/2015/EC) and the Regulation 1719/2016/EC establishing a guideline on forward 
capacity allocation. 
                                                 
37European Commission webpage. Available from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate/fully-integrated-internal-energy-market_en 
38ENTSO-E (2014) ENTSO-E Overview of Internal Electricity Market related project work. Brussels, Belgium, pp. 4. 
39Keay, M. (2013) The EU “Target Model” for electricity markets: fit for purpose?. The Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies, Oxford Energy Comment, Oxford, UK, pp. 2. 
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As mentioned, TM is based on market coupling. Given that there are various models 
for market coupling, price coupling is the model chosen by European regulators, 
meaning simultaneously determination of volumes and prices in all relevant zones, 
based on the marginal pricing principle40. Market coupling aims at the efficient use and 
allocation of cross-border capacity by equalizing prices between adjacent countries 
and allowing the lowest priced bids to be accepted up to the point that congestion 
limits further trade. Thus, market coupling maximizes the total economic surplus for all 
participants using a central algorithm. Additionally, market coupling allows electricity 
transactions to be conducted implicitly between the Member States, meaning that 
electricity and capacity are not sold separately41.  
3.2 The six key areas of Target Model 
Generally, TM focuses on 6 key areas, which once harmonized can lead to a complete 
IEM. These areas cover: forward, day-ahead, intraday and balancing markets, capacity 
calculation and governance. Regarding the harmonization of capacity calculation and 
allocation methods, TM proposes a flow-based allocation method in highly-meshed 
networks and alternatively the Available Transfer Capacity Method (ATC)42. TM also 
foresees the creation of a single platform for long-term transmission rights allocation 
(Physical of Financial Transmission Rights) as a financial hedging instrument. Regarding 
day-ahead capacity allocation, as analyzed, TM establishes a single market coupling 
mechanism according to which cross-border supply and demand bids are matched 
with the available cross-border transmission capacity automatically (implicit auction) 
creating price convergence. Additionally, TM envisages the establishment of an 
intraday cross-border market characterized by continuous implicit trading with gate 
closures at harmonized, pre-determined times. Regarding the establishment of a 
common balancing market, it is going to be regulated by the Network Code on 
                                                 
40ACER webpage (2017). Available from:  
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/electricity/regional_initiatives/cross_regional_roadmaps/pages/1.-market-
coupling.aspx 
41See supra note 26, pp. 47.  
42ACER (2011) Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for Electricity. Ljubljana, 
Slovenia, pp. 7. 
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Electricity Balancing, which, however, has not been adopted at the time of writing of 
this document. Finally, for the more effective governance of IEM, each Member-State 
has the obligation to define one or more Nominated Electricity Market Operators 
(NEMOs) «to perform in cooperation with TSOs single day-ahead and intraday 
coupling»43. 
Despite its complexity, TM and market coupling are expecting to bring important 
benefits to EU energy consumers. Specifically, market coupling is estimated to save 
customers from €2.5 to 4 billion a year or about €5 to €8 per capita per year44, which is 
«2.6% of the value of 2012 wholesale demand, but more than 100% of the current 
gains from trade over the interconnectors»45. If the full integration of EU´s electricity 
market is achieved, the benefits could range from €12.5 billion to €40 billion per year 
by 203046.It is argued that market coupling delivers total benefits that should 
substantially exceed the costs of the required market design changes. However, 
despite the financial benefits that TM presents and despite the fact that the TM was 
initially scheduled to be implemented until the end of 2014, market integration has not 
been yet totally succeeded. For example, intra-day allocation and shared balancing is 
still work in progress while, even if the share of market coupling at the day-ahead 
market rose from 60% in 2010 to 84% in 201547, in some Member-States, such as 
Greece, market coupling is not applicable yet. 
 
                                                 
43Regulation 1222/2015/EC, article 7.  
44Booz & Company (2013) Benefits of an Integrated European Energy Market. Booz & Company Amsterdam, report 
prepared for DG Energy European Commission, pp. 3. 
45Newbery, D. et al (2015) The benefits of integrating European electricity markets. Energy Policy, Vol. 94, pp. 261.  
46See supra note 44, pp. 89. 
47ACER/CEER (2016) Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets in 
2015. Ljubljana, Slovenia. pp. 29. 
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4. The case of Greece 
The Greek wholesale electricity market design has a major effect on the national 
electricity transactions with the neighbouring counties. In this chapter, it is explained 
the importance of electricity imports/exports for the Greek electricity market. 
Additionally, the basic features of this market and the role of the three key-regulatory 
players (RAE, ADMIE, LAGIE) on cross-border issues are analysed. Finally, the 
preconditions on the participation in the national electricity market and, thereby, in 
exports/imports procedures are briefly explained. 
4.1 Greece: An import-depended country? 
Electricity is the second‐largest energy source in Greece, with a final electricity 
consumption of 50.787 GWh48 and net electricity imports equal to 18.9% (9.608 GWh) 
of final consumption for 2015 (in contrast to 4.3% for 2013 and to 8% for 2006)49. As it 
turns out, imports are an important source of electricity supply for Greece and that is 
especially true not only for the last two years, but also for the last fifteen years, during 
which interconnection capacity with neighbouring countries increased significantly. 
Specifically, Greece has been a net importer of electricity for all of its interconnections 
since 2001, importing a net 1.784 GWh in 2012, a net 2.100 GWh in 2013, a net 8.819 
GWh in 2014 and a net 9.608 GWh in 201550. The fluctuations in the volume of 
electricity imported, i.e. from 2013 to 2014, are explained by a number of factors such 
as the abolishment of 30% rule for the Injection Offers of thermal units affecting the 
price of national production, the excess of electricity supply in some countries of the 
Balkan region (i.e. Romania) and the progressively reduced production of lignite fire 
plants. It must be noted that especially the last three years, electricity imports are 
                                                 
48For the sake of precise, this amount must be decreased almost 10% which is equal to the electricity consumption 
in the non-interconnected system of the country [ADMIE (2014) Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2015-2024. 
Athens. Greece, pp. 124 (in Greek)]. Non-interconnected system is independent and does not participate in 
electricity imports/exports.  
49Eurostat (2016). Electricity and heat statistics webpage (2017). Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_and_heat_statistics 
50ADMIE (2016) Electricity Power Adequacy Study Report for years 2017-2023. Athens, Greece, pp. 27. 
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made for economic reasons since the price of imported energy is lower than the 
production cost of domestic oil and natural gas plants51. 
However, irrespectively of price-competitiveness reasons, electricity imports in Greece 
are expected to increase significantly in the next years due to inefficiencies in national 
electricity production capacities. More analytically, even if the prolonged economic 
crisis has limited considerably the electricity demand in Greece (total electricity 
demand in 2015 amounted to the levels that were observed in 2004), it is expected 
that it will start to increase again, especially after the year 2020. As a consequence, for 
the period 2020-2021, there may be an increased likelihood for the production system 
not to meet adequately the load peaks, while from 2022 onwards the adequacy of the 
system is expected to depend largely on imports. The main reason of system adequacy 
problems consist the large-scale decommissioning schedule of old lignite-fired units by 
2020 (units of Kardia and Amydeo) for environmental reasons52. Additionally, the high 
penetration of RES in the national system and the Greek target of 40% of gross 
electricity consumption to be generated by RES by 2020 increase the need for system´s 
stability and, thus, for extended electricity imports and exports in the next years. 
To sum up, apart from price-related reasons, cross-border electricity transactions are 
expected to be the answer to the problem of national production inefficiencies in the 
future due to increase in electricity demand and the retirement of lignite-fired units. 
Increased electricity imports/exports would also enhance the reliability of the system, 
which is threatened by the high RES penetration. However, it must be noted that any 
forecasts beyond the year 2020 could be proven to be quite unreliable53. 
4.2 The key regulatory factors & cross-border electricity trade 
As a Member-State of the EU since 1981, Greece is obliged to comply with the EU 
legislation. For the case of electricity, with the exception of the part of community law 
which is directly enforceable, the Third Liberalization Package was implemented in 
August 2011 with the Law 4001/2011, which transposes into national law the Council 
                                                 
51See supra note 50, pp. 25. 
52See supra note 50, pp. 38. 
53ENTSO-E (2016) Mid-term Adequacy Forecast. Brussels, Belgium, pp. 79 
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Directive 2009/72/EC. The Greek Law 4001/2011 shapes the Greek electricity market 
and contains provisions regulating the powers of the NRA, the Greek TSO and the 
Operator of Electricity Market. More specific rules on the electricity market and 
electricity transactions are defined in the System Operation Code (SOC) and the Power 
Transactions Code (PTC), which are developed by RAE. The implementation of these 
codes is supervised by RAE, ADMIE and LAGIE, which have the most important 
competencies regarding cross-border electricity trade. 
4.2.1 Regulatory Authority for Energy (RAE) 
RAE, which was established in July 2000 by the virtue of Greek Law 2773/99 according 
to the provisions of Directive 96/92/EC, is an Independent Administrative Authority 
that monitors the operation of the liberalized energy market. Initially, its competencies 
were limited, but with the new regulatory regime established by the Law 4001/2011, 
the role of RAE has been importantly strengthened. RAE possesses extensive advisory 
and normative powers (designation of secondary legislation such as codes), the power 
to issue individual administrative acts and to impose penalties. RAE also acts as a 
dispute settlement authority with respect to complaints against ADMIE. The 
contribution of RAE to the function of the cross-border electricity trade in Greece is 
detrimental: guarantee of fair competition conditions and non-discriminatory access to 
the networks, granting of licenses to the electricity traders, modification of network 
development plans, issuing of rules for interconnections´ access and exchange of 
information with the NRAs of other Member-States, so as to «…. to enable an optimal 
management of the system, to promote joint electricity exchanges…..to ensure an 
adequate level of interconnection capacity, including new interconnections regionally 
and between regions…»54. 
As long as the legal nature of RAE is concerned, it consists an Independent 
Administrative Authority with distinct legal personality and financial autonomy and its 
Members are personally and operationally independent. RAE´s independence concerns 
its relations not only with the State, but also with the ex-monopolistic utilities and the 
private parties participating in the electricity market. In contrast to the previous 
                                                 
54Greek Law 4001/2011, article 25 par. 5. 
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legislative framework, RAE is subjected only to parliamentary scrutiny and its actions 
are subjected to review by the judiciary. It could be said that RAE consists an 
administrative body in a broad notion and, as such, its powers are exercised in full 
respect of the principles of administrative law, including inter alia transparency of 
administrative actions, impartiality and equal treatment of individuals. It is to note that 
the delegation of powers to RAE was awarded by the secondary European legislation 
which, however, left to the discretion of Member-States the determination of the 
organizational and functional details of NRAs55. 
4.2.2 Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO or ADMIE) S.A. 
ADMIE S.A. was certified as the Greek Transmission Operator S.A. with RAE´s final 
Decision 692A/2012 and after taking into consideration the Opinion of the European 
Commission. According to the requirements of the Third Liberalization Package 
regarding the legal and functional unbundling of the TSOs´ functions and the Greek 
Law 4001/2011, the market model applied in the Greek Transmission Operator is the 
ITO one. ADMIE S.A. was initially established as a 100% subsidiarity of the state-owned 
Public Power Corporation (PPC) with 51% of its assets belonging to the State and the 
rest to individuals. However, since 2014 a privatisation process has begun and 24% of 
ADMIE´s assets has been currently sold to private investors. ADMIE S.A. owns the 
electricity network transmission system and is responsible for its development, 
operation and maintenance. 
ADMIE´s competencies include the conduction of the real-time dispatch, the clearing 
of the imbalance market, the calculation of the ex-post System Marginal Price (SMP) 
and the publishing on a daily basis of forecasts for electricity production and demand. 
Regarding cross–border trade, ADMIE S.A. has a fundamental role in electricity 
transactions: it determines the interconnections usage, publishes forecasts of 
interconnections capacities, maintains the necessary accounts pertaining to the 
collection of interconnection congestion charges and, under prejudice of other 
agreements, auctions on an annual, monthly and daily basis the interconnections´ 
                                                 
55Chatzikonstantinou, Ch. (2013) Regulation of Networking Energy Markets: The case of natural gas market. MA 
Thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, pp. 54-58. 
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capacity. Additionaly, ADMIE S.A. cooperates with other TSOs and is a member of 
ENTSO-E, of Joint Auction Office and of SEE Coordinated Auction Office . 
Concerning the legal nature of ADMIE S.A., it consists, according to its funding law, 
Société Anonyme governed in principle by the civil law. However, it may be inferred by 
the powers assigned to it, that ADMIE S.A. has the character of a «dual» legal person 
(governed by both private and public law depending on the case), which sometimes 
acts as an administrative authority, i.e. it has the power to deny access to the network 
and the power to curtail PTR´s, and sometimes acts as a private company, i.e. it has the 
power to provide technical advisory services on matters of competence of managers or 
owners of transport systems for a fee56. It has been argued that the unilateral acts of 
ADMIE S.A. are administrative acts and that is reasoned by its monopolistic regime, by 
the high percentage of ADMIE´s assets belonging to the State and by the services of 
general interest it provides57. 
4.2.3 Operator of Electricity Market (LAGIE) S.A. 
Another factor with an important role in the functioning of the electricity market is 
LAGIE S.A., which was established by virtue of Greek Law 4001/2011 and carries out 
the activities formerly carried out by the HTSO S.A., apart from the ones that according 
to article 99 of Law 4001/2011 are transferred to ADMIE S.A. Additionally, in 
December 2015, following the Decision 69976/8−9−2015 of the Minister of 
Environment and Energy, LAGIE S.A. was designated, as «Nominated Electricity Market 
Operator»(NEMO), to perform the single day-ahead and intraday coupling, in 
accordance with article 4 of Regulation 2015/1222/EC.  
Specifically, LAGIE S.A. is responsible for conducting the Daily Energy Programming of 
the System and is responsible for the financial transactions between the corresponding 
parties. It cooperates with ADMIE S.A. regarding financial and technical issues and 
generally applies the provisions of the Electricity Market legislation such as solving the 
day-ahead market and conducting its clearing and receiving energy injection offers by 
                                                 
56Greek Law 4001/2011 article 94 par.2.ια and par. 5. 
57Paraskeuopoulou, K. (2012) Market Liberalization and the Transformations of the Public Interventions in the 
Electricity Sector. MA Thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, Greece, pp. 85.  
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all power producers. Furthermore, LAGIE S.A. keeps a Register of electricity market 
participants in accordance with REMIT´s provisions and may participate in joint 
operations of TSOs and Power Exchanges to create regional markets and to facilitate 
the establishment of the single electricity market. Last but not least, according to the 
article 4 par. 5 of the Regulation 1222/2015, as a NEMO, LAGIE «shall have the right to 
offer day-ahead and intraday trading services with delivery in another Member-State. 
The trading rules in the latter Member-State shall apply without the need for 
designation as a NEMO in that Member State». However, it is to note that in Greece, 
LAGIE S.A. has been established as a national legal monopoly for day-ahead and 
intraday trading services58 and as such Greece «may refuse cross-border trading 
services offered by a NEMO designated in another Member State; however, the 
protection of existing power exchanges in that Member State from economic 
disadvantages through competition is not a valid reason for refusal»59. 
Regarding the legal nature of LAGIE S.A., the same remarks as for ADMIE´s case are 
applicable. Specifically, LAGIE S.A. is a «dual» legal person, which according to the 
article 117 par. 1 of the Greek Law 4001/2011 «operates under the rules of private 
economy and is governed by the provisions of the Law 2190/1920», but according to 
the Decision 2406/2014 of Council of State (Special Solidarity Levy case), «even if 
LAGIE is a company in the form of Société Anonyme, it operates in the case of 
examination (issuance of informative/pay slips to the RES electricity producers) for the 
sake of the public interest, exercising public authority». 
 
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that Energy Law is a branch of law that 
includes a mixture of rules belonging to both public and private law. Its main 
provisions lie in the public law (formation and regulation of the energy market), and 
specifically in the administrative law, due to the reason that energy sector is linked to 
the public interest and public services. Energy Law has its roots in community law, 
which is implemented directly or through national administrative law. Apart from the 
                                                 
58ACER webpage (2017). Available from: 
http://www.acer.europa.eu/en/Electricity/FG_and_network_codes/CACM/Pages/NEMO%20list.pdf 
59Regulation 1222/2015/EC, article 5 par 1. 
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administrative law, energy law borrows provisions and enforcement mechanisms from 
other branches of law such as commercial and competition law60. 
4.3 An introduction to the Greek wholesale electricity market design 
Greece´s liberalized electricity market design, with the exception of the retail market, 
may be divided into two separate markets61: wholesale electricity market and long-
term capacity market. The long-term capacity market includes the Long-Term Capacity 
Market in the Interconnections, which is analyzed in the next chapter, and the Capacity 
Assurance Market. Capacity Assurance Market remunerates the Producers for 
maintaining their units in operational readiness limiting their business risk and at the 
same time aims to ensure the electricity purchased by electricity Suppliers is backed up 
with the corresponding generation capacity. For this reason, Producers issue Capacity 
Availability Tickets (CATs) for their net capacity and Load Representatives purchase 
these CATs to cover their supply obligations plus a security margin. 
For the organization of its wholesale electricity market, Greece has adopted a 
mandatory pool model, initially established by the Greek Law 3175/2003, aiming to 
maximize the social welfare of the electricity market. The Greek wholesale electricity 
market is divided into the following three sub-markets: (1) the Day-Ahead Market, (2) 
the Daily Ancillary Services Market and (3) the Imbalances Market. The Day-Ahead 
Market means that all the electricity produced, consumed and transferred the 
following day within Greece is traded through a mandatory pool. Producers and 
Importers are obliged to offer the entirety of their capacity (Injection Offers) to the 
pool and to the sole electricity off-taker in Greece, LAGIE, in order to receive the 
payments corresponding to the energy injected into the grid, which (the payments) are 
calculated on the basis of the so-called System Marginal Price62. Correspondingly, Load 
                                                 
60See supra note 57, pp.8. 
61The analysis provided in this section concerns only the interconnected system of Greece and not the non-
interconnected Islands which dispose local autonomous electricity systems and are do not participate in 
imports/exports activities. 
62The SMP is calculated as follows: total demand is determined by the crossing point between the demand curve of 
the market (aggregating supply curves of all buyers) and the supply curve of the market (aggregating demand 
curves of all sellers), after having given priority to some sellers (RE, mandatory hydro plants, mandatory imports) 
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Representatives and Exporters can buy electricity by submitting Load Declarations and 
be charged the SMP which is common for electricity sellers and buyers, under 
prejudice of inter-zonal constrains. Bilateral contracts for physical delivery between 
Producers and Load Representatives are not permitted. The settlement of the day-
ahead market is based on the hourly power prediction for the specific day based on a 
«technical» algorithm, which co-optimizes energy and reserve at the Day-Ahead stage. 
In the Daily Ancillary Services Market, the necessary ancillary services and reserves are 
offered by the Producers and bought by Load Representatives. It is to note that energy 
and ancillary services are traded in the day-ahead market simultaneously. Given that 
Greece lacks a real-time market, Balancing Market is crucial for electricity transactions 
because the extraordinary transactions, that take place in real time in order to ensure 
the balance of the System on the Dispatch Day, are cleared in this market (charged or 
compensated, according to the Imbalance Price). To close up with, it is to note that in 
the Greek electricity market, the Public Power Corporation (PPC), the incumbent 
vertically integrated ex-monopoly utility, remains dominant in both the generation and 
retail sectors and holds exclusive rights on the exploitation of the great majority of 
lignite and hydropower sources. However, the establishment of NOME auctions is 
expected to minimize the negative effect of these exclusive rights to the competition. 
4.4 Electricity Importers/Exporters´ participation in the wholesale electricity market 
4.4.1 Licenses & registration with the Participants´ Register 
Electricity imports and exports in Greece are organized by a set of rules which could be 
divided into «interregional» rules, meaning the common imports/exports rules 
applicable in the countries involved in joint electricity transactions, and national rules, 
meaning the rules applicable only in one of the interconnected countries. In this 
section, the national rules of Greece are analyzed. To begin with, electricity imports 
are permitted only to the users of the Greek transmission system which are the 
holders of a supply or trading license and those who are qualified as Auto Producers. 
Exports are permitted only to the holders of production, supply or trading licenses. The 
                                                                                                                                               
over other sellers (mainly thermal fossil fuel plants). The price of the market is then determined by the most 
expensive of the offers of supply retained. 
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supply, generation and trading licenses are issued by R.A.E. Trading and supply licenses 
are issued only to applicants which have the legal form of Société Anonyme or of 
Limited Liability Company (Ltd).  
In order to participate in the wholesale electricity market, either to import or to export 
electricity, the entity concerned must register with the Participant Register kept by 
LAGIE. Βy registering with the Participant Register, Participants enter into (1) the «DAS 
Transactions Contract» with LAGIE and (2) the «System Operator Transactions 
Contract» with ADMIE63, governed by PTC and SOC respectively. By virtue of the 
Contracts, Participants are granted the right to participate in the DAS Transactions 
System and in the System Operator Transactions System and, depending on the case, 
receive or make corresponding payments to LAGIE and ADMIE respectively. The 
Contracts under examination are not subjected to any other formality, besides 
registration with the Participant Register, which is realized by the approval of the 
applications submitted for conclusion of the (1) and (2) contracts by ADMIE and LAGIE. 
According to the article 2 of PTC and SOC, applications must be accompanied by 
supporting documents such as the copy of production, trading or supply license and 
bank account number (Participant Account) that the applicant is obliged to keep in 
credit institution legally operating in Greece, to satisfy the obligations arising from the 
two Contracts. Finally, specifically, for electricity traders and suppliers, it is demanded 
a bank guarantee or a Deposit receipt. 
4.4.2 Injection Offers & Load Declarations 
Generally, it could be said that in the Greek electricity system imports are treated as 
generation and exports as demand. As such, in order to participate in the DAS market 
electricity importers are requested to submit Injection Offers a day before the 
Dispatch Day and into a specific timeline, which is defined from 12: 00 to 12: 30. The 
Injection Offers are submitted in the form of an XML file submitted on the DAS 
electronic information system. To upload their injections, Importers must insert to the 
system their user name, access code and a unique electronic security ID, provided by 
LAGIE S.A. Each Injection Offer must contain for each hour (dispatch period) of the 
                                                 
63PTC, article 1 par.2 & SOC, article 1 par.2. 
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Dispatch Day and for each interconnector one stepwise function of price and quantity, 
each step of which consists of a pair of energy amount (MWh) and its price (€ / MWh). 
This function can include up to ten steps, under the provision energy prices for 
successive steps to be monotonically increasing. Prices at all levels must be non-
negative and more than or equal to the Administratively Defined Minimum Injection 
Offer Price, which for imports and exports is equal to zero. Of course, Injection Offers 
for imports must be supported by equivalent Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs), but 
the capacity of inter-zonal flows is not auctioned separately. However, when capacity 
internal constraints occur, the Importers are remunerated by the day-ahead Zonal 
Marginal Price (ZMP) at the relevant interconnection, instead of the SMP. It must be 
highlighted that there is not charge for system use in order to import electricity, 
provided that the same applies to the country of origin (reciprocity principle) according 
to the article 281 of SOC. The results of the day-ahead market clearing are published at 
ADMIE´s electronic platform at 14: 00, the day before the Dispatch Day. 
Correspondingly, electricity exporters must submit Load Declarations in order to 
participate in the DAS market. The submission procedure, the type and the context of 
Load Declarations are similar to those of the Importers´ Injection Offers. However, as it 
is normal, Load Declarations must contain for each hour of the Dispatch Day and for 
each interconnection monotonically decreasing prices which must be less than or 
equal to the Administratively Defined Maximum Load Declaration Price. It is to note 
that in the case of electricity exports, Meter Representation Declaration are not 
required because each Interconnection´s Meter is represented by DAS Participants 
who submitted Load Declaration for export through the respective Interconnection 
Corridor. An additional prerequisite for the admissibility of Declaration is that Load 
Declaration must be accompanied by a certificate issued by the credit institution 
where the Load Representative maintains the Participant Account, certifying that there 
is sufficient balance in the Account to cover the financial obligations arising from the 
Load Declaration. Exporters are always charged the day-ahead SMP, irrespectively of 
inter-zonal constraint problems.  
Another prerequisite for the participation in the DAS market is the obligation posed by 
the article 179 of SOC, which stipulates that each Participant must provide guarantees 
for the fulfillment of obligations arising from the System Operator Transactions 
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Contract. The existence of these guarantees is a precondition for the participation in 
the DAS market. It is to note that in the case of inadequate national electricity 
production, ADMIE S.A. can submit Injection Offers in order to import electricity. These 
Offers are charged according to the procedure of article 121.Γ. (1) of SOC. More details 
on DAS market participation are provided on PTC and on PTC´s Manual. 
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5. Cross-border electricity trade in Greece 
Greece is interconnected with all of the neighboring countries in its Northern borders 
and, additionally, it is interconnected via sea cable with Italy. However, the 
interconnected markets to the Greek electricity system are characterized by significant 
differences in their maturity and liberalization level and that is the reason why 
different interconnections capacity allocation auction rules are applied in each case. In 
this chapter, the basic principles of these auction rules are listed and a brief analysis of 
each electricity market interconnected to the Greek system is provided. 
5.1 Greek electricity interconnections 
Despite the fact that during the last 13 years the Greek electricity system has been 
operating in parallel with the European System managed by ENTSO-E, «the relevant 
electricity market for Greece is, to a significant extent, the national market, as a 
regional market has not emerged yet»64. Greece is interconnected through overhead 
AC lines, mainly of 400 kV with Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Bulgaria in Northern Borders and through an HDVC cable with Italy in the North West. 
Additionally, a new interconnection overhead AC line with Turkey was activated in 
September 2010 and entered into commercial operation in April 201565. It is notable, 
that Greece has reach the 10% interconnection target as its electricity interconnection 
capacity was equal to 11% in 2014 and with the scheduled PCI (especially, the AC 400 
kV interconnection between Maritsa East 1 in Bulgaria and Nea Santa in Greece) the 
target of 15% for 2030 can be reached66. 
Greece consists a net importing country with the amounts of energy imported to be 
significantly increased from 2013 to 2015 (from 2013 to 2014 overall imports increased 
by 101%). An indicative example consists the fact that imports used to be equal to 4%-
6% of the country’s total consumption, but rose to 18% in 2014. In 2015, electricity 
imports represented 85% of the total electricity cross-border transactions (instead of 
                                                 
64RAE (2015) 2015 National Report to the European Commission. Athens, Greece, pp. 16. 
65ADMIE (2016) Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2017-2026.  Athens. Greece (in Greek), pp. 27. 
66European Commission (2015) Country Factsheet Greece. SWD (2015) 226 final, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 3. 
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36% for 2013), while exports only 4% (instead of 5% for 2013) and the rest of the 
traded electricity was transit67. Bulgaria is the country with the largest share of exports 
to Greece representing more than the one-third of the total Greek imports. On the 
contrary, imports from Turkey correspond to the lower percentage of total imports. 
Regarding the most recent trends in imports/exports, it is indicatively mentioned that 
for the first semester of 2016, 31% of Greek Interconnections Transmission Rights Net 
Revenues came from imports from Bulgaria, 25% from imports from FYROM, 18% and 
17% came from imports from Albania and Italy respectively. Additionally, 2% of total 
revenues came from exports to Italy and 2.3% from exports to Turkey68. 
According to the article 178 of SOC, ADMIE S.A. is responsible for the use of the 
revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnections and according to the article 
16 of the Regulation 714/2009, these revenues can only be used for specific purposes, 
namely for network investments and for increase of capacity availability. However, 
there is the possibility the revenues to be used, under the condition of NRA´s prior 
approval, as income to reduce network tariffs. For the case of Greece, with the RAE´s 
Decision 425/2015, it was decided the interconnection revenues of the second 
semester of 2014 and of the first semester of 2015, to be used partially (60 millions) to 
decrease network tariffs and the rest (4.5 million) to be used for the construction of 
the new interconnection between Greece and Bulgaria, which was qualified as a PCI69. 
It is notable that the revenues of the second half of 2015 and the first half of 2016 are 
equal to 46 million €, that is to say 29% less than the revenues of the last period, due 
to imports decrease70. 
Irrespectively of this current imports´ decrease, it was shown that the Greek import 
dependency is expected to increase in the future. For this reason and given that most 
of its neighboring countries are not Members of the EU and, thus, not subjected to EU 
                                                 
67ADMIE (2016) Interconnection Statistics Greece 2015. Athens, Greece, pp. 7. 
68ADMIE (2016) Interconnections Capacity Rights Yearly Report Reference Period: 1st Semester 2016. Athens, 
Greece. Available from: 
http://www.admie.gr/fileadmin/groups/EDRETH/Interconnections/interconnections_capacity_rights_report_1st_se
mester_2016.pdf 
69RAE Decision 425/2015 on Management of Interconnections Revenue for 2016 (in Greek). 
70RAE (2016) Report on Management of Interconnections Revenue. Athens, Greece, pp. 2 (in Greek). 
  -39- 
electricity legislation, the development of common legislative bonds with these 
nations and the Balkan region, in general, is very important in order to facilitate Greek 
electricity exchanges. Consequently, the establishment of the Energy Community in 
2005 between the EU and countries such as Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and Romania (at 
that time not members of EU) and Turkey (as observer-country) was welcomed by 
Greece. Energy Community sets minimum requirements for the establishment of 
competitive electricity markets based on the adoption of the EU’s legislation, the so-
called «acquis communautaire»71. It is to note, that the guarantee of the 
uninterrupted operation of electricity transactions within all the Balkan region through 
the Energy Community is detrimental for the increase of electricity imports/exports in 
Greece, given that Bulgaria and Romania are significant exporters of electricity while 
Albania, FYROM are major importers (transit countries for imports to Greece) and 
thereby one of the main directions of electricity flow in Balkans is from north to south. 
Consequently, the establishment of a stable market regulatory framework in any of 
these countries may have a positive effect on the Greek electricity market. 
5.1.1 Electricity market in Bulgaria 
Bulgaria is a major electricity exporter to Greece and that is not only because Bulgaria 
has an enormous, in comparison to Greece, production capacity but also because its 
generation is largely based on domestic lignite sources and nuclear power, «resulting 
in low base load electricity generation costs, making the Bulgarian wholesale electricity 
market one of the cheapest in the EU»72. Greece is interconnected with Bulgaria 
through a 400kW transmission line between Thessaloniki (EL) and Blagoevgrad (BG), 
while the interconnection of the two countries is going to be reinforced after the 
construction of a new transmission line between N. Santa (EL) and Maritsa East 1 (BG). 
The construction of the new transmission line has been labelled as a PCI by the 
                                                 
71Energy Community webpage (2017). Available from: 
https://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/ENERGY_COMMUNITY/What_we_do 
72Directorate-General for Energy of European Commission (2016) Quarterly Report on European Energy Markets. 
Brussels, Belgium, pp. 31. Available from:  
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_european_electricity_markets_q4_2
015-q1_2016.pdf 
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European Commission and is expected to «facilitate market integration by increasing 
the transfer capacity (and, thus, solve the problem of loaded transmission lines, 
especially during summer),….to increase the volume of exchanges between the 
Continental Europe synchronous area and Turkey and ... to contribute to the safe 
evacuation of the power from the wind farms and photovoltaic expected to be 
installed close to the borders of the two counties»73.The project is expected to be 
commissioned in 2021. 
Regarding the Bulgarian internal electricity market, the country does not yet have 
enough mature market meeting the standards of western-European energy markets. A 
de facto single-buyer model is currently in place for the regulated sector of Bulgarian 
electricity market and it was only in January 2016 that the Independent Bulgarian 
Energy Exchange (IBEX) started its operation. Additionally, the State-owned Bulgarian 
energy incumbent, BEH, has been accused of abuse of its dominant position (i.e. 
supply contracts concluded between BEH and third parties imposing restrictions on 
where these third parties could resell the electricity bought from BEH74). Furthermore, 
Bulgarian TSO, called ESO, was unbundled by BEH in 2014 according to the ITO model, 
but until that moment, it was closely interconnected to BEH, provoking important 
distortions to cross-border trade. Such a distortion consist the imposition of electricity 
export tariff which raises significantly the price of the electricity exported. It must be 
highlighted that Bulgaria has been accused in the past of changing regularly the fixed 
electricity charges according to the prices prevailing in neighbouring countries75. From 
the above, it can be concluded that market liberalization in Bulgaria has not been 
achieved yet and the existing competition distortions may have a negative effect on 
the electricity transactions with Greece in the long-term. The ban on electrical power 
exports introduced in Bulgaria from 13th January to 7th February 2017(!) due to 
national imbalances reinforce these concerns. 
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74European Commission (2015) Antitrust: Commission accepts commitments by Bulgarian Energy Holding to open 
up Bulgarian wholesale electricity market. Press Release IP/15/6289, Brussels, Belgium. Available from: 
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75IENE (2012) A Strategy Study on the Electricity Interconnections of SE Europe and Greece’s Role”. Assessment 
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5.1.2 Electricity market in Italy 
Greece is interconnected with Italy through a submarine electricity cable with 
maximum transmission power of 500 megawatts and 160 km length. Electricity trade 
with Greece began in 2002 and has ranged from net imports of 2.3 TWh to net exports 
of 1.6 TWh76. Despite the fact that for 2014 and 2015 Italy was a net exporter to 
Greece, generally, Italy is an electricity net importer with net imports of around 15% of 
national electricity consumption, a number explained by the high national electricity 
prices (higher than the average electricity price in EU). It must be noted that 
unscheduled technical faults have usually in the past put out of service the Italian-
Greek interconnection and the most recent example is the service outage occurred in 
October 2016. These technical problems and the consequent curtailment of allocated 
PTRs, increase the uncertainty for Traders and they may be the reason of the large 
negative risk premia77 in Greek–Italian transactions, which make them inefficient78. 
Regarding the Italian electricity market, it consists the more liberalized and 
competitive electricity market in comparison to the other electricity markets 
interconnected to the Greek system. To begin with, the Italian wholesale electricity 
market consists of a day-ahead market and an intraday market. Both markets are 
managed by the electricity Market Operator (called GME). GME, additionally, manages 
the forward market. The Italian TSO is TERNA which was established as such in 2005. In 
2013, TERNA was certified as TSO under the ownership unbundling regime. It is 
notable that Italy uses the Single Buyer model. The largest single supplier of electricity 
is Enel, but the relatively high liquidity and price performance of the wholesale market 
suggest that market power abuse is inexistent79. In compliance with the Target Model 
prerequisites, Italy made an important step towards the IEM in 2015 and specifically in 
February 2015: it coupled its day-ahead electricity market with France, Austria and 
                                                 
76IEA (2016) Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Italy 2016 Review. Paris, France, pp. 101. 
77Risk premium is equal to the difference between the TR price and the expected cash-flow from the electricity 
transaction [ACER/CEER (2015) Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas 
Markets in 2014. Ljubljana, Slovenia.] 
78ACER/CEER (2015) Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets in 
2014. Ljubljana. Slovenia, pp. 182. 
79See supra note 76, pp. 119. 
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Slovenia. «As a result, the now-coupled area is called Multi-Regional Coupling (MRC) 
and covers now 19 countries, standing for about 85% of European power 
consumption»80. Unfortunately, Greece and Switzerland are the only neighboring 
countries to Italy which are not coupled to MRC yet. 
5.1.3 Electricity market in Turkey 
Interconnection with Turkey is the most recent interconnection to the Greek electricity 
system. Although Turkey is not an ENTSO-E member (currently an Observer Member of 
ENTSO-E), its system is connected to the Continental Europe Synchronous Area (CESA) 
in parallel synchronous operation. The Greek electricity system has been 
interconnected to Turkish system since 2010 through a transmission line of 400 kV 
between N.Santa (EL) and Babaeski (TR). For 2014, the Greek electricity imports from 
Turkey represent the 70.8% of the total Turkish exports, while Greek electricity exports 
to Turkey only the 0.05% of the total Turkish imports81. The Turkish system is further 
interconnected to Europe through the Bulgarian system. In September 2010, the 
launch of a pilot synchronous and parallel operation of the electrical system of Turkey 
with the European system through the Greek and Bulgarian transmission lines was 
held. In 2013, the ENTSO-E Regional Group Continental Europe (CE) increased the 
capacities available for commercial use between CE and Turkey to 550 MW for imports 
to Turkey and to 400 MW for imports to CE. Upon agreement, these capacities are 
divided by a ratio of 2/3 for the border with Bulgaria and 1/3 for the border with 
Greece82. 
As long as the Turkish electricity market is concerned, it is in the process of 
transformation into a competitive open market characterized by consisted 
liberalization and privatization policies. To begin with, generation activities are carried 
out by the state-owned generation company EÜAŞ, by private generators and by auto 
producers. In 2014, the total share of private companies in the market was around to 
68%. After the completion of the privatization process, this share is expected to reach 
                                                 
80EPEX SPOT webpage (2017). Available from: http://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling  
81IEA (2016) Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Turkey 2016 Review. Paris, France, pp. 134. 
82See supra note 64, pp. 18. 
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at least 90% of the total installed capacity83. Additionally, regarding distribution sector, 
the privatisation of the state-owned electricity distribution facilities has been 
completed since 2013 and currently, twenty-one distribution companies are all legally 
unbundled and privatised. On the other hand, TEİAŞ, the state-owned electricity 
transmission company, is the sole Transmission Operator, owning and operating all 
transmission assets of the country84. Privatization of TEİAŞ is not planned in the short 
or medium term. What is notable is that a formal wholesale electricity market has 
been established in Turkey only in 2015, including a day-ahead and a continuous 
intraday market.  
From the above, it is concluded that during the last years the Turkish electricity system 
has made significant steps towards the establishment of a competitive and well-
developed electricity market. However, according to IEA´s 2016 Turkey Report, the 
country should continue down this path and reform its energy markets and special 
attention should be paid to the establishment of a more cost effective tariff system, in 
order to avoid competition distortions. However, even if the liberalization of Turkish 
electricity market is expected to have a positive effect on the exchanges with Greece, 
the recent political tensions over Aegean Islands between the two countries and given 
the obligation of prior approval by the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural 
Resources (MENR) of electricity imports/exports, the reliability of Turkey as an 
electricity counterparty of Greece may raise concerns for the future. 
5.1.4 Electricity market in Albania 
Greece is interconnected to Albania through a transmission line of 400 kV between 
Kardia (EL) and Zemblak (AL). Albania has been a member of SEE CAO since April 2015. 
Additionally, in 2015, Albanian TSO signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a 
regional security coordination initiative with the TSOs of several countries including 
Greece. The initiative aims at introducing a coordinated capacity calculation for day-
ahead allocations. Albania is also a member of the Energy Community. It is to note that 
Albania is energy depended to its neighboring countries, as it is a net electricity 
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importer. The fact that hydropower dominates its electricity generation mix makes 
Albania electricity depended during specific periods of the year. On the contrary, in the 
months of excess electricity generation, Albania consists a flexible electricity exporter. 
Concerning the Albanian electricity market, it is currently under significant regulatory 
reforms. More analytically, Albania has transposed the Third Energy Package into the 
national law, but secondary legislation and, thus detailed rules regulating the market, 
have not been yet developed, delaying the implementation of the Package. For 
example, the certification procedure of the Albanian TSO, called OST, opened in the 
summer of 2016, but the deadline for the completion of its ownership unbundling was 
set at the end of 2017. Additionally, an action plan for the establishment of a power 
exchange until the end of 2017 has been adopted. TPA and provisions on congestion 
management have already been transposed into the national law. Concerning DSO, the 
state-owned supply company has not been unbundled yet, while the wholesale market 
is dominated by the state-owned and controlled generation company called KESh. 
Furthermore, the established conditions for real-time balancing are not market-based 
or compliant with the communautaire acquis85. Generally, the Albanian wholesale 
market is still overregulated. From the above, it is concluded that Albania has made 
steps towards the opening of its market to the competition, but further measures are 
required to permit the full liberalization of its market. 
5.1.5 Electricity market in FYROM 
Greece is interconnected to FYROM through two transmission lines of 400 kV: from 
Thessaloniki (EL) to Bubrovo (FYROM) the first and from Meliti (EL) to Bitola (FYROM) 
the second. As mentioned, FYROM is a transit country for electricity imports to Greece, 
given that FYROM is a net importer country. In June 2016, the TSO of FYROM, called 
MEPSO, became a shareholder of the regional capacity allocation body SEE CAO and 
begun to participate in regional allocation of interconnection capacity in November 
2016, after it failed to comply with a 2008 decision of the Energy Community imposing 
the obligation to adopt a common coordinated congestion management method for 
allocation of capacity to the market.  
                                                 
85Energy Community Secretariat (2016) Annual Implementation Report 2015/2016. Vienna, Austria, pp. 27-29. 
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As long as the electricity market in FYROM is concerned, it presents an extremely low 
level of compliance with the legislative obligations imposed by the Energy Community, 
to which FYROM is a member since 2005. Specifically, FYROM has missed the deadline 
for implementing the Third Energy Package by 1 January 2015: the state-owned TSO, 
which also performs the functions of a market operator, is only legally unbundled by 
the state–owned DSO utility. Additionally, eligibility of the households has been 
postponed until 1 July 2020 in violation of Energy Community´s Treaty. Furthermore, 
the procurement of ancillary and balancing services is still highly regulated creating 
obstacles to FYROM´s participation in regional initiatives. Finally, excessive price 
regulation, in particular, wholesale price, hinders the development of electricity 
market86. It is to note that on 13 May 2016, the Secretariat of Energy Community 
submitted a Reasoned Request to the Ministerial Council against FYROM for failure to 
transpose the Third Energy Package. To sum up, electricity market in FYROM is only 
partly liberalized and privatized. This fact limits competition and market integration 
with neighboring electricity markets.  
5.2 Basic principles for access to cross-border infrastructure 
As it has been analyzed, electricity is an infrastructure-depended commodity and, thus, 
interconnections capacities have a significant effect on cross-border electricity trade. 
Commercial interconnections capacities are always less than the interconnections 
nominal thermal capacities, due to a number of factors (which however are beyond 
the scope of this paper) and to a minimum security margin (n-1 rule applied in all the 
Balkan region). The calculation of the commercial interconnections capacities is 
realized by the national TSOs and can be based on different methods87: according to 
the Target Model, TSOs need to apply a flow-based capacity calculation method 
(CACM Regulation). In the case of Greek interconnections, the so-called Net Transfer 
Capacity Method (NTC) is applied88. 
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After the nationals TSOs calculate the commercial transfer capacity of the 
interconnections and the available transfer capacity for imports/exports, they publish 
the relevant results on their sites and a procedure for the allocation of the capacity 
takes place. The so-called explicit auctions, a market-based method, constitute the 
method used in the Greek electricity market regarding the allocation of 
interconnections capacity allocation to the interested parties. According to this 
method, transmission capacity is auctioned to the market separately from the 
electricity, in the form of Physical Transmission Rights (PTRs). However, explicit 
auctions reduce transparency and can lead to inefficient use of interconnectors 
because traders are forced to reserve ex-ante cross-border capacities independently 
from the electricity price differentials in the interconnected markets. On the contrary, 
in implicit auctions, which constitute the method adopted by the Target Model, «the 
auctioning of transmission capacity is included in an electricity auction “implicitly”»89, 
limiting the inefficient use of interconnectors. 
In the Greek electricity market the interconnection capacity allocation auctions are 
performed either by ADMIE S.A. in collaboration with the interconnected TSO or by a 
third Auction Office. Specifically, at the Bulgarian border, the Bulgarian TSO performs 
the monthly auctions, while ADMIE S.A. performs the yearly and daily auctions and is 
responsible for the management of the secondary market. In these auctions, Common 
Capacity Allocation Rules are applied since 201190. Regarding Italy, since 2011, capacity 
auction rules were performed by the Capacity Allocation Service Company (CASC S.A.), 
which also provided capacity allocation services to the whole Central–South Europe 
(CSE) Region. In 2015, the CASC S.A. was succeeded by the Joint Allocation Office (JAO) 
and since 2016 PTR auctions have been performed by JAO. Concerning the borders of 
Albania and Turkey, capacity allocation auctions are realized by the South East Europe 
Coordinated Auction Office (SEE CAO). From November 2016 SEE CAO begun to 
perform the capacity auctions in the borders of FYROM. Before these dates, in 
Albanian, Turkish and FYROM borders the capacities allocation auctions had been 
                                                 
89Mantysaari, P. (2015) EU Electricity Trade Law. Springer Publications, Switzerland, pp. 424. 
90RAE (2015) 2015 National Report to the European Commission. Athens, Greece, pp. 19.  
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performed according to independent rules, with the scheme of 50%50% management 
applied by ADMIE and each of the other three TSOs91. 
According to the article 19 and to the Annex I of the Regulation 714/2009: «NRA when 
carrying out their responsibilities shall ensure compliance with this Regulation». «NRAs 
shall regularly evaluate the congestion management methods». Additionally, the 
article 19 of the Greek law 4001/2011 stipulates that RAE establishes, monitors and 
supervises the implementation of rules for access to the interconnections. Finally, 
according to the article 280 of the SOC, the System Operator has the obligation to 
submit to RAE every year a plan of terms and rules governing auctions for the 
transmission capacity allocation in interconnections. The auctions´ rules must be 
approved by RAE. From the above, it is concluded that capacity auction rules depend 
on RAE´s approval. This principle applies to the case that the auctions are performed 
by SEE CAO and JAO.  
Regarding the competence of ADMIE S.A. to transfer to SEE CAO and JAO the 
authorization to realize capacity allocation auctions in Greek borders, it is to note, 
firstly, that according to the article 94 par.2 (Ιβ) of the Law 4001/2011, ADMIE can 
participate in associations, organizations or companies, which aim at establishing 
common rules on the allocation of transmission rights and at managing those rights on 
behalf of the national TSOs. Besides, there is no legal national rule forbidding Greek 
TSO to sign a contract for services outsourcing parts of its Capacity Allocation tasks to 
an Auction Office. On the contrary, it is implicitly permitted under some conditions, 
such as the prior approval of auction rules by RAE92. Additionally, both SEE CAO and 
JAO specifically declare that they perform in their «own name but on behalf and for 
the account of the Participating TSOs explicit allocation of available transmission 
capacities on the borders between Participating TSOs»93 and that any payment 
collected by the auction offices through the Auction would be treated as the property 
of ADMIE S.A.  
                                                 
91 RAE (2014) 2014 National Report to the European Commission. Athens, Greece, pp. 18. 
92Kyriakopoulos, Th. et al. (2014) SEE CAO: its role in the Integration of Electricity Markets. In Energy: Networks and 
Infrastructure, Farantouris, N. (editor), Nomiki Vivliothiki Publications, Athens, Greece, pp. 68-69. 
93SEE CAO website (2017). Available from: http://www.seecao.com/our-work 
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5.2.1 General principles for capacity allocation auctions 
The Annex I of the Regulation 714/2009/EC provides some guidelines on the allocation 
of interconnections´ NTC between the national electricity systems. The rules included 
in the Guidelines are quite general and establish some principles which are applicable 
in the case of the Greek transactions:  
I. Open access to the interconnections through the auction process. Access to the 
interconnection shall not be restricted and TSOs shall accept all commercial 
transactions under the prejudice of congestion (1.1-1.2 of Annex). From this 
principle deviates the rule of the Auction of the Maximum Capacity, meaning 
that the use of the interconnections is eliminated only by congestion and 
security-related reasons. 
II. Non-discrimination. All possible market participants shall be permitted to 
participate in the allocation process without restriction and it shall not be 
discrimination between market participants wishing to use their rights to make 
use of bilateral supply contracts or to bid in Power Exchanges (2.7, 2.10 of 
Annex). Value is the only criterion for bids to be qualified as successful. 
Additionally, no transaction-based distinction shall be applied in congestion 
management (1.6 of Annex). Discrimination prohibition is, furthermore, applied 
in the case of discrimination in favor of national markets against the 
interconnected system. TSOs shall not limit interconnection capacity in order to 
eliminate congestion in the internal of their countries (1.7 of Annex). 
III. Transparency. TSOs shall publish all relevant data related to network 
availability, network access and network use on the basis of the best possible 
forecast (when demanded). Information such as the congestion management 
procedures in use, the times and procedures for applying for capacity, the 
productions offered and the obligation and rights of both TSOs and capacity 
holders shall be described in detail and made available to all potential network 
users freely in a transparent and easily accessible manner (5.1, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.9 
of Annex). Additionally, transparency obligations are applied in the cooperation 
between TSOs. TSOs shall exchange regularly set of data to enable load flow 
calculations in their relevant area (5.10 of Annex) Finally, NRAs shall be 
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transparent regarding the use of revenues resulting from ATC´s allocation (6.2 
of Annex) 
IV. Cost-effectiveness. Congestion-management methods shall be market-based 
(implicit and/or explicit auctions) to facilitate an efficient use of 
interconnections and cross-border trade. When defining appropriate network 
areas in which congestion management is to apply, TSOs shall be guided by the 
principle of cost-effectiveness. In the case of incompatibility of scheduled 
transactions with the security limits, TSOs shall alleviate congestion and ensure 
that any associated costs remain at an economically efficient level (2.1, 1.7 and 
1.3 of Annex). 
V. Coordination. Coordination between TSOs shall include all the steps from 
capacity calculation and optimization of allocation to secure operation of the 
network. Coordination includes the exchange of information between TSOs. In 
the case that electricity transactions between two countries (TSOs) have an 
effect on the flows in a third country (TSO), congestion-management methods 
shall be coordinated between all the TSOs (3.5, 3.6 and 3.1 of Annex). 
Other principles established by the Guidelines may have a less general character: The 
rights allocated in the auctions are firm transmission rights of different time-frames 
(short-term and long-term rights) subjected to the use-it-or-sell-it or use-it-or–lose-it 
principles. Capacity rights to be firm must be nominated to the TSOs by a defined 
deadline. In the case that the TSO curtail the allocated transmission rights, it shall be 
liable to compensate the holders of the rights for their loss. Correspondingly, if 
participants do not fulfill their obligations, they pay a charge. Non-used transmission 
rights shall be freely tradable on a secondary basis. More details regarding this 
principles are provided in the next paragraphs. 
5.2.2 Common principles for capacity allocation in the Greek borders 
Interconnections capacity allocation auctions in all Greek borders are based on some 
common principles/provisions, namely:  
i. Auction process is performed in accordance with the principles of the 
Regulation 714/2009. 
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ii. Cross-border capacity is allocated via Explicit Auction Process in the form of 
Physical Transmission Rights (PTR) only. 
iii. All timings set in the Auction Rules make reference to the Central European 
Time (CET) and all financial information are expressed in Euro (€). 
iv. Auction Processes are organized and executed electronically through the 
Auction Platforms. 
v. Auctions are carried out on a Yearly, Monthly (Long-Term transmission rights) 
and Daily basis. 
vi. Auction Processes provide only PTRs. Auction Participants can invoke no other 
right than PTR. 
vii. Long-Term Transmission Rights are auctioned on a firm basis with the 
exception of Network Security reason or Force Majeure. In these cases, the 
Allocated PTRs can be curtailed. 
viii. Long-Term Transmission Rights are curtailed on a «pro rata» basis.  
ix. Daily PTRs are firm. 
x. In the case of the Curtailment, each Auction Participant whose PTRs have been 
curtailed is entitled to reimbursement by the relevant TSO/Auction Office. After 
reimbursement, no further liabilities will arise. 
xi. Long-term Transmission Rights are freely transferable/sold between 
participants on a secondary market, under the condition of TSOs/Auction 
Office´s approval. 
xii. Auction´s rules and results are published on TSOs/Auction Offices´ website. 
xiii. Participants´ bids are submitted anonymously (personal details are secured by 
means of encryption). 
xiv. For each Product, the Bids are ranked in decreasing order based on its Prices. 
The Bids with the highest Bid Price are being selected until the entire Offered 
Capacity auctioned is exhausted. 
xv. Auction´s participants have the right to contest the results of the auction 
process until deadline´s expiration. 
xvi. Allocated Long-Term Transmission Rights are subject to the «Use it or Sell it 
principle», according to which allocated rights that have not been nominated 
by Program Exchanges in Scheduling Process to Participating TSOs are 
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automatically resold on the daily Auction Process, under financial 
remuneration. 
xvii. TSOs/Auction Offices are entitled to process all data of the Auction 
Participants, but confidential information may not be disclosed to a third party 
without the other Party's prior and expressed consent. 
It is to note that according to the Manual of the Power Transaction Code (page 61), 
regarding the use of PTRs in the Greek market and independently from the TSO that 
allocated the PTRs, procedures and deadlines for scheduling exchange programs for 
the energy imported into Greek territory (or exported from it) are regulated only by 
the Greek legal texts. 
5.2.3 Auction process and PTRs nomination 
In order to participate in electricity exports/imports in Greece, the interested parties 
must be equipped with the corresponding PTRs which are provided in cross-border 
capacities allocation auctions. In order to participate in these auctions, the parties 
must fulfill specific criteria, some of which are common in every auction and some are 
slightly different. Concerning the common prerequisites and according to the JAO, SEE 
CAO and GR-BG auction rules for 2017 all the participants must be enrolled to the 
Participant Register kept by LAGIE and conclude all relevant contracts with ADMIE and 
LAGIE. Additionally, interested parties must fill a Statement of Acceptance of auction 
conditions, where it is incorporated the declaration that no insolvency, bankruptcy or 
other similar legal proceeding have been commenced in relation to them. Finally, the 
interested parties must fulfill specific financial requirements (deposit contract with the 
relevant TSO/Auction Office or Bank Guarantee), which are used as risk management 
instruments.  
Under the condition that the participants are judged «eligible» to participate in the 
auction process, the first can submit their bids in the time period between the Gate 
Opening and Gate Closure (the moments in which the Auction Process commence and 
finish) as determined by the published Auction Specifications. Each bid contains the 
year, month or day to which the Bid refers; the product specification, bid Quantity 
expressed in MW and price expressed in €/MWh. If a Bid Quantity exceeds the Offered 
Capacity announced in the Auction Specification, this Bid is rejected. Each submitted 
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bid consists an unconditional and irrevocable offer by the Auction Participant to 
reserve the PTR up to the Bid Quantity and at prices up to the Bid Price. Participant 
maximum number of bids submitted for a product may vary (usually from ten to 
twenty). The bids are submitted electronically by the use of specific codes which are 
provided by the administrator of the auction platform and reveal the Participant´s ID 
after the auction´ completion. After a short time from the gate closure, participants 
are informed of the auction´s results. It is notable that if the total Bid Quantity of all 
submitted valid Bids is equal to or lower than the relevant Offered Capacity, the 
Marginal Price is zero (0) €/MWh and if not, the Marginal Price is equal to the lowest 
Bid Price selected. Once PTRs are allocated to the beneficiaries, there is the possibility 
for the Long-Term transmission rights, to be transferred to a transferee through the 
secondary market (daily PTRs are not transferred) or to be returned to relevant TSOs 
for resale (Use it or Sell it principle) or to be used. These options are under the 
prejudice that the Auction Participant, who wants to transfer its Allocated PTRs has 
fulfilled its financial obligations towards TSOs/Auction Offices. 
In order an allocated PTR to be used by its holder to export or import electricity 
from/in the Greek market, it must be nominated in the Scheduling process which is 
organized by the concerned Participating TSO (for the case of Greece by ADMIE). 
Specifically, Statements of PTRs´ Use must be submitted by the PTRs holder in a 
specific time frame: by 7:00 of the Day-Ahead for the Long-Term PTR and by 12: 30 of 
the Day-Ahead for the Daily PTRs94. PTRs Holder must additionally designate its 
Counterparty in the interconnected energy market, who can be either himself, 
provided that he is a register market participant in the interconnected market (cross-
nomination), or a different User (or more), who is registered as a market participant in 
the interconnected market. ADMIE confirms these Statements of PTRs use and delivers 
them to the interconnected TSO to confirm them. After this confirmation, PTRs are 
nominated and in combination with the submission of Injection Offers or Load 
Declarations they can lead to electricity imports or exports respectively. It is to note, 
that in DAS resolution, Long-Term PTRs have a priority towards Daily PTRS. 
 
                                                 
94Manual of PTC, page 37. 
  -53- 
CONCLUSIONS 
Cross-border electricity trade may have a major contribution in the accomplishment of 
European Union´s fundamental energy targets, namely: a secure, competitive and 
decarbonized electricity market. For the case of Greece, extensive cross-border 
electricity transactions have the same advantages as for the rest of the European 
Union and maybe even more. Specifically, according to the adequacy forecast of 
ENTSO-E and ADMIE, future electricity production in Greece after 2020 is possible not 
to meet the demand and thereby imports are expected to cover the production´s 
inefficiencies. Additionally, the ambitious targets for electricity production from RE and 
mainly solar power in Greece make electricity transactions with neighboring countries 
an effective response to the intermittency problem of RE. Finally, cross-border 
electricity trade in Greece may have a crucial contribution in achieving more affordable 
electricity prices due to the openness of the national market to competition. That is 
significantly important for the Greek people suffering from energy poverty during the 
last years because of the prolonged financial crisis. 
However, despite its advantages, cross-border electricity trade in Greece is limited and 
not compatible with the European view of an IEM. To be more specific, as it has been 
shown, electricity market structure in Greece presents great differences from what the 
Target Model asks for: an important deficiency is the lack of an intraday electricity 
market which would allow participants to clear their positions closer to real-time, so to 
avoid penalties due to deviations in the purchased in real time quantities. Additionally, 
daily transmission rights in interconnections are allocated through explicitly auctions, 
while implicit auctions are the allocation method allowing both the more efficient use 
of interconnections (electricity flows to the right direction, meaning to the market with 
the lower electricity price and not the opposite) and the market coupling with other 
neighboring countries.  
Another inconsistency of Greek electricity system with the European model is the fact 
that the cost of ancillary services is incorporated into the energy price, the so-called 
SMP, distorting electricity price and making it impossible to be compared with the 
electricity prices in other European countries. Furthermore, the national system lacks a 
market for forward contracts to hedge the price risks and lacks a balancing market to 
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balance the production and consumption of the system in real-time and to coordinate 
with the local balancing markets at a regional level. It is to note that the choice of a 
mandatory pool and the prohibition of bilateral contracts between market participants 
have a negative effect on competition in favor of PPC, the dominant in electricity 
generation and supply ex-monopolistic entity. Finally, the current almost exclusive 
rights of PPC on lignite and hydropower sources, that is to say on the «cheap» 
electricity, eliminate the national competition and, thus, the cross-border transactions. 
The so-called NOME auctions are expected to alleviate the problem, but only partially. 
Consequently, it is concluded that electricity market in Greece has to experience great 
reforms in order to create favorable conditions for cross-border electricity trade and to 
comply with the EU Target Model.  
Of course, cross-border electricity trade is possible for Greece irrespectively from the 
compliance with the EU provisions and the Target Model. However, as it was shown, 
market coupling includes great advantages for the national electricity markets and 
more extensive and efficient cross-border transactions. Realizing that fact and with the 
aspiration to participate in the single European electricity market, Greek legislator has 
currently put the national electricity system in the process of reforming the wholesale 
market, in order to conform to the EU Target Model rules and to the Regulation 
1222/2015/EC. The Greek Law 4425/2016 is the most decisive step towards this 
direction: it includes provisions for the establishment of a forward market which 
permits only for transactions with physical delivery of electricity, a day ahead market 
which is to be cleared through an algorithm called Euphemia and which adopts the 
implicit allocation method for the allocation of transmission rights in interconnections, 
an intra-day market with intraday sessions and in a second phase with continuous 
intra–day trading and a balancing market 95. It is notable that the Greek Law 
4425/2016 is enforceable since September 2016, but as it contains general provisions 
the establishment of Codes regulating electricity market is necessary for its 
enforcement. The time frame for the operation of each Market will be defined by a 
Ministerial Decision after the establishment of the required codes.  
                                                 
95RAE (2016) Draft of Guidelines and Instructions to the competent Market Operators for the establishment of 
Market Codes according to the par. 5 of the art.6 of the Law 4425/2016. 
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From the above analysis, it is concluded that electricity wholesale market in Greece 
and cross-border electricity trade rules are in a transitional phase. Important steps 
have been made and are going to be made in the near future in order to achieve the 
coupling of the national electricity market with the markets of the other European 
Member-States. However, due to the limited maturity of the electricity markets to the 
North borders of the country, market coupling is possible initially with the market of 
Italy which is already coupled with all of its neighbors except Switzerland and Greece. 
Thus, apart from the national reforms which are demanded to take place in order 
Greece to adopt the European rules on cross-border trade, market coupling with the 
North West Europe and the Balkan region depends on the readiness of neighboring 
markets to follow the same direction. 
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